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I.  INTRODUCTION
     Most historians know Robert Lowe (1811-1892) as .Gladstone’s 
first Chancellor (1868-73) and the leading orator against the Reform 
Bill of 1867.    Educationists to this day criticise or praise his Revised 
Code of 1862, which introduced payment by results in schools. 
Historians of economic thought add Lowe’s critique of relativism 
(evinced by his views on Ireland) and his stridently classical 
statements of the role of political economy from his later dispute with 
the English historical school. 
         Lowe was a hard, fierce man with a gift for enmity.   Disraeli 
designated him the one Liberal whose hand he would refuse to shake. 
Victoria vastly preferred even Gladstone.    “If he noticed that flames 
were crackling around him he reached out and fanned them” is 
Winter’s (1976) comment on Lowe’s career as a whole. If so, his years 
as a barrister and legislator in New South Wales (1842-50) were the 
ones when he reached for the kerosene.  His sojourn even included 
two challenges to duels.  One was avoided when his opponent was 
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arrested on the way to meet him, the other declined by Lowe on the 
grounds that his opponent, though now an alderman, had 
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previously been a non-commissioned officer. And the ministerial style 
which would dominate his career was set when, to a deputation of 
Australian bankers who claimed they “could not live” if a certain 
proposal went through, he snapped “And pray, why should you live?” 
(Knight, 1966, p.255) 
      Lowe’s roughness and sarcasm coloured every public argument in 
which he took part.  It was the same after his return to England, 
where, in addition, he managed to infuse his own abrasive qualities 
into the discourse of economists.  It was not just what he said but his 
manner of saying it which placed him, in the eyes of John Stuart Mill 
and Cliffe Leslie, on the pinnacle of  “vulgar economics.”  But there is 
one complex, neglected and very profuse strand in Lowe’s writings 
which gives a far more ambivalent portrait of the man and his 
thoughts.   This is the series of leading articles Lowe wrote for The 
Times  between 1851 and 1868.
        Lowe’s defective eyesight (he was an albino) and succession of 
ministerial posts did not stop him keeping up an average of three 
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leaders a week over this seventeen-year period.   They were of course 
anonymous and it is only from 1857 that the Times archives have a 
record of who wrote what.    So distinctive is Lowe’s voice however 
that anyone interested in puzzling out the authorship was not 
required to labour very hard at the breakfast table.   And Lowe’s 
editorials can normally be taken as an accurate and unconstrained 
version of his personal opinions.  John Delane’s summary was that 
Lowe was able to “shoot his own arrows” behind the shield of The 
Times, and his correspondence with Lowe confirms this. 1 
        To economists, Lowe’s most remarkable set of leaders are those 
about the commercial treaty with France in 1860.  Coming a close 
second are his analyses of the financial side of the American Civil War. 
Both have a significance well beyond the actual topics in hand.   On 
the treaty, Lowe’s uncharacteristic changes of mind, and the variety of 
positions to which these reversals took him, provide a classic 
instance, telling to this day, of how Ricardians fail to cope with free 
trade by negotiation.   The Civil War  -- and its second front, 
personally opened up by Lowe, of the Union versus political economy 
--  was the occasion for a series of reflections on economics more 
complex than anything he later achieved when celebrating the 
centenary of the Wealth of Nations  or doing battle with the 
historicists. 
3
        The first half of this article, then, examines Lowe’s political 
economy as set out in the leader columns of The Times.   The second 
reassesses his later and better known pronouncements in the light of 
the first.
II.  LOWE AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH TREATY OF 1860
        The repeal of the corn laws, Lowe wrote in The Times soon after 
he arrived home from Australia, “overleaps the ordinary achievements 
of legislation as the Arc de Triomphe towers over the low-lying 
buildings at its feet.” (Times, 26 February 1851, p.4)
And in one of his first parliamentary speeches he praised Gladstone’s 
great free-trading budget of 1853 for upholding “the grand principle 
of Free Trade – far more valuable than Free Trade itself – that no one 
class in the country should be made tributary to another class.” 2  
This, to Lowe, was the defining principle of Liberalism and the 
unalterable background against which his frequent changes of heart 
over current commercial diplomacy were to unfold.
        But after the 1853 budget there was a hiatus in the attack on 
protection, even though Lord Palmerston’s first ministry (1855-8) 
negotiated some minor commercial treaties outside Europe.  However, 
when Palmerston returned to office in 1859 with Gladstone, now a 
Liberal, as his Chancellor, the push towards freer trade was 
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determined and immediate.  Its first result was Richard Cobden’s 
commercial treaty of 1860 with France. 
      To the many purists still alive in the Liberal Party, as well as the 
economists J.R. McCulloch and Bonamy Price, any such treaty was 
more a betrayal than an extension of free trade.   If cutting tariffs was 
right,  as it always was unless the tariffs were needed for revenue, it 
remained right whatever the other country did.   Some unilateralists 
were placated by the most-favoured-nation clause within the Treaty, 
ensuring that Britain would benefit from any subsequent treaties 
signed by France with third parties.  But the consensus was that the 
treaty’s rationale was more political and diplomatic than economic. 
Lord Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary, said as much in his admission 
that “The treaty is thoroughly unsound, and a great mistak, [but] 
rejecting it, making an enemy of the Emperor .. would be a far greater 
mistake.”  (Steele, 1991, p.97).  A retrospective Gladstone was to be 
blunter still: “There were only two alternatives, one of them the 
French treaty and the other war with France.” (Howe, 1997, p.173) 
This was Cobden’s own position; indeed “Cobdenite” and 
“Cosmopolitan” became interchangeable terms for the view that free 
trade was a fetter of mutual dependence which would restrain nations 
from breaking loose into war with each other  3
         Even if he had not been outside the Cabinet, Lowe as Vice-
President of the Board of Education would have been one of the lesser 
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weights as Palmerston’s Government oversaw the French treaty. 
But the Vice-President was leading a double life, odd even by the 
more relaxed standards of the time, as chief critic of the Treaty in the 
leader columns of The Times.    Even odder, and highly 
uncharacteristic of Lowe, was the chief critic’s habit of altering his 
position almost weekly.
        At the most basic level there was  no reversal. Lowe knew his 
Ricardo.   Abolishing tariffs  -- provided they were not needed to raise 
revenue – was an economic good whatever the other side did.   Even 
to contemplate treaties which made free trade a multilateral, 
negotiated affair, was to send out an economically illiterate message 
and fix surviving protectionists in their delusions.
             Nonetheless Lowe oscillated between four different positions. 
The treaty, consistently, was founded on faulty political economy, but
1… this condemned it per se
2 … it was to be condemned even if it had not been founded on faulty 
political economy
3 … it should however be approved for non-economic reasons
4  … it was still an economic improvement on no treaty 
        Lowe started in the third position. The Times, he wrote on 16 
January 1860, was “not disposed, as at present advised,  to regard 
with favour any proposition for a return to the exploded practice of 
negotiating commercial treaties, but as to the general character of the 
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measure sketched out, there can be no difference of opinion, at least 
on this side of the Channel.”  In other words he was for it.  Why, if the 
practice had been rightly exploded?   Because, said Lowe, peace came 
before even political economy, and anything which freed up trade 
promoted peace.   Bring Anglo-French trade up to the levels of Anglo-
U.S. trade, and you will have rendered war “absolutely impossible.” 
(Times,  16 January 1860, p.6) 
        A week later Lowe pulled himself together with a biting diatribe 
against the Treaty.  Among those bitten was Robert Lowe no.3.  Now 
Lowe 1 related how he had supposed that England, no longer being a 
child, had put away childish things.   Instead the government was 
making war on political economy, which rightly ruled that tariffs were 
justified only to collect revenue.  To negotiate with France over tariffs 
made no more sense than negotiating with France over what your 
poor rate should be. 
         It was in this editorial that Lowe made his sole fleeting 
reference to Robert Torrens’s case for reciprocity, based on the 
demonstration that unilateral removal of tariffs could make a country 
poorer by worsening its terms of trade.   Lowe merely commented 
that  reciprocity was “the last colour that is assumed by the dying 
dolphin of Protection”, and that, though Torrens’ arguments for it 
were “not entirely without force”, they were overwhelmed by the case 
for deciding “our own taxation in strict accordance with abstract 
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science.” Moreover, commercial treaties actually obstructed free 
trade:  “If we are to have commercial treaties we shall negotiate at 
the greatest possible disadvantage unless we have imposed on 
ourselves most exorbitant duties.”  Finally, after observing that a 
trade treaty with protectionist France was like a treaty of religious 
toleration with the Pope, Lowe took up the argument that, if the 
Treaty gave our coal and iron access to France, only a pedant would 
complain about its misalignment with economic correctness.  But who 
were the real economic obsessives here,  Lowe asked.  The opponents 
of the Treaty, or supporters who could think only of export earnings as 
they furnished a belligerent France with “the two most important 
elements of war – coal and iron”? (Times, 23 January 1860, p.6. ) 
        The treaty now emerged in a very odd fashion.   Gladstone’s 
budget of February 1860 spelt out nearly everything that Britain was 
“conceding”, as Lowe wouldn’t have put it.   But all that France had so 
far promised was that prohibitions of British imports would be 
replaced by duties not exceeding 30%.   The actual level of these 
duties would be announced unilaterally by France once she had 
investigated, industry by industry, what was needed to “equalise the 
conditions under which domestic and foreign producers worked.” 4  
Britain, with its own “offer” set out, had no threats or promises left to 
try and influence this process.   Its manufacturers might be invited 
over to Paris to assist the French investigation, but in the end all 
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Britain could do was check the French facts and figures and doubt 
their accuracy when convenient (which Cobden duly did in the 
autumn of 1860.)
        Lowe was not in a very strong position to condemn this order of 
play which, after all, largely divorced the detailed proposals of each 
side from his demons of negotiation, threat and reciprocity.  On the 
other hand, he may have felt that a treaty which legitimised these 
evils just by being a treaty, only to hand to France all the strategic 
advantages of declaring last, got the worst of all possible worlds. 
Such ambiguities in his mind would help to explain why his 
tergiverisations now picked up speed. Initially, in the wake of 
Gladstone’s budget, Lowe softened still further, even (27 February 
1860) crediting the treaty with improving British perceptions of 
France to the point where “instead of regarding her as a storehouse of 
every possible danger and mischief, we are now beginning to look 
upon her as a magazine of many good things, as a land whose wine we 
shall drink, whose manufactures we shall improve.”    He then 
changed his position a third time, back to unqualified hostility.  By 
May he was condemning exactly the unilateralist aspects of the treaty 
which might have helped reconcile him to it.  Britain, he said, was 
unambiguously cutting duties against France, and whether she got 
anything in return would “depend solely on the favour and generosity 
of our magnanimous ally.”  (Times, 7 May 1860, p.8.)  And by August 
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he was saying he had known all along that “we were bound to get the 
worst” from the “huckstering negotiation” which had so successfully 
returned Britain to the days when politics had been mixed up with 
finance.    
        Political economy was now re-enthroned as the sole arbiter of 
trading policy.  It forbade negotiating over tariffs and that was that. 
“The truths of science are no more fitting subjects for international 
compact than the dictates of morality.”   But instead of following 
political economy, we had followed “the wisdom of Mr Gladstone, 
which is wisdom of another fashion from that of Adam Smith, Ricardo 
and Mill.”  Not the least damage done by Gladstone’s wisdom was the 
revival of the business attitude which blamed government for all its 
troubles.  Commercial circulars which blamed the treaty for slackness 
of trade might well be right. The point, however, was that blaming the 
government invariably preceded an extension of its role – quite apart 
from the “degradation” of merchants who had gone to Paris to beg 
favours from a foreign power. Whether the “peace” argument might 
still have trumped Adam Smith for Lowe is unclear because he now 
abandoned it.   If this is a treaty for peace, he asked, why had we just 
raised defence spending by another £1.2 million to protect ourselves 
from France? (Times,  1 August 1860, p.8) 
      At the end of 1860 the final details of the French side of the treaty 
were published. Gladstone must have been gratified by Lowe’s 
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response that it might all have been a lot worse: “we have paid dear 
for this treaty but we cannot deny that we have got something to show 
for our money.”   But not as much as France, whose gains were 
beyond narrow financial calculation.  Prohibitionist France had been a 
brave and confident nation hobbled by an unfounded and 
uncharacteristic timidity about the quality of her goods.  But now, 
Lowe believed, all this would give way. “Limited competition will give 
confidence, and confidence will in its turn whet the appetite for more 
competition.”  (Times, 4 December 1860, p.8)  
        How right he had been about this, claimed Lowe, when in 1862 
he reviewed the treaty’s first two years.   The grief of the French 
protectionists, far more avid to be proved right than to see their 
country prosper, only added to the satisfaction everyone else ought to 
be feeling.
        “We can no longer recognise in the French Protectionist the 
lighthearted inhabitant    
        of  the beautiful land of the orange and vine – the gay, gallant, 
thoughtless cavalier,   
       ever ready to set Europe in a blaze, and to dance gaily round the 
conflagration.     
       There is a deep and guttural emphasis in the growl with which 
the French  
       Protectionist receives every fresh development of Free Trade, 
which assures us that   
       there must be some very solid prosperity at the bottom of so 
much ostentatious 
       discomfort.”  (ibid.,  27 May 1862, pp.9­10) 
After this final flourish Lowe no.4 took charge and was never again dislodged.   His final 
editorial on the subject provided his strongest statement that once the truths of political 
11
economy were understood, all sides would rush to remove duties unilaterally and “we shall 
hear no more of Treaties of Commerce.”  (ibid., 19 February  1863, p.8)
        Even with a writer as invigorating as Lowe, it would be tedious to 
chronicle every remark he made about the Cobden treaty, and we 
have not done so.   We have, however, charted the twisting road he 
followed on an ordnance survey rather than a motoring map, because 
its details possess a significance larger than Lowe’s own career.   It is 
as much a fact today as in 1860 that, in matters of commercial policy, 
it is the dogmatic free traders who are the least robust while more 
malleable folk, paradoxically, take a course of stern resolve.   And this 
is because commercial treaties, just by being treaties, pose a nigh-
insuperable dilemma for Ricardian economics.   One horn we have 
seen – you cannot negotiate without encouraging the delusion that 
unilateral tariff-cutting is a sacrifice, rather than an economic gain 
regardless of what anyone else does.    The other horn, however, is 
that cutting tariffs unilaterally is a sacrifice if, in doing so, you give up 
the chance to persuade others, however misguided their logic, to 
follow suit.   In the end, therefore, it is the convinced free traders who 
take out the weights and the balance every time some detail within 
the situation changes, while those less certain, or less 
comprehending, of the Ricardian message forge blithely ahead with 
agreements on wine and multifibres, wheat and microprocessors. 
Anyone cognisant with, say, the modern Economist  magazine’s 
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attitude to the World Trade Organisation, will feel on familiar ground 
as they read about the 1860 treaty and Lowe.
III. FREE TRADE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
        Free Trade to Lowe was the issue par excellence to drive home 
the scientific status of political economy.   And “scientific” meant 
mathematical and irrefutable, not empirical and falsifiable.   Thus 
doubters over the efficacy of abolishing the corn laws were people 
who
        “ … applied principles drawn from political experience to 
economical science.     
        They forget that they had passed out of that region of 
compromise and conjecture in 
        which the politician is ever doomed to dwell, and got into the 
region of absolute 
        truth, which works out the conditions deducible from its 
premises with something 
        very nearly approaching to mathematical precision.” (Times, 14 
October 1858, p.6)
The abolitionists in contrast had realised exactly what political 
economy was, had applied it to the issue in hand, and so had rightly 
“dealt more in abstract and general principles than any speeches that 
ever were addressed to a large multitude”.  (ibid., 27 September 
1861, p.6)  Naturally this could be only as effective as the mental 
limits of the multitude allowed.   And inevitably, some protectionists 
would congratulate the backward section of the working class, 
elevating their stupidity into a hard-headed refusal to be seduced by 
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abstractions.   Lowe feared that scientific truth would remain the 
preserve of the “classes qualified by education to comprehend”.  True, 
those who could not manage the principles might be converted by 
experiencing the benefits of free trade.  “Nature makes Protectionists, 
knowledge and observation freetraders.” But this was a slow business, 
with an implacable protectionist enemy: “death, which mows down 
day by day the ripened harvest of education and experience.” (ibid., 3 
March 1860, p.8) 5
        In his editorials discussing the nature and appeal of free trade, 
Lowe adumbrated a number of themes which were to dominate his 
political and intellectual career: absolutism in economics; empiricism 
as a useful second string for convincing those unable to accept the a 
priori  certainties which were the real political economy; pessimism 
about popular understanding of economic issues.   Lowe never quite 
elucidated the circumstances in which ignorant humanity would or 
would not hit on eternal economic truths and translate them into law; 
what rather tied his analysis together was his complete confidence 
that once good economic laws were enacted, however accidentally, ex 
post perception of their overwhelming merits would make them 
unassailable.
        “[This] kind of law, of which history unhappily affords us very few 
examples, is 
        founded on abstract truth, which it brings for the first time 
prominently and 
        practically before the world.   Its influence strengthens with its 
duration, clamour 
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        and prejudice are hushed and die out, and that which was at first 
mistaken for a more 
        local and temporary arrangement is recognised in its true 
character as a rule of 
        universal utility, a solid step onward in the progress of the human 
race.
          “Such a law – we may now say without contradiction – was the 
Bank Charter Act 
        of 1844.” (Times, 25 March 1861, p.8 
   In this passage at least, Lowe is firmly on J.S.Mill’s agenda, namely that the economist’s 
task is to discover the conditions of application of economic doctrines. (Prediction as the 
purpose of economics was to come much later, and get Lowe into much posthumous 
trouble.)   Unlike Mill, however, Lowe thought it transparent that economists and the 
economy had been working together steadily to broaden these conditions of application. 
Thus when in 1864 he accused even Adam Smith of faint­heartedness, he also implied that 
Smith’s date of birth was both explanation and excuse:
        “Nothing proves more clearly the title of political economy to the 
dignity of a 
        science than the fact that the better it is understood and the 
more its abstract 
        deductions are tested by experience, the more general and the 
better they become.   
        The theory came from its great author hampered with many 
exceptions, but the 
        course of inquiry, which so often leads to the introduction of 
exceptions to general  
        rules, has tended in this instance to prove that they never ought 
to have been made.   
        That the doctrines of Free trade do not apply to agriculture, that 
the interest of 
        money ought not, like every other price, to be permitted to 
regulate itself according 
        to demand and supply and, above all, that shipping should be 
secured to a country 
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        by the exclusion of foreign competition, are all heresies which 
have been held by 
        distinguished men and sanctioned by great names, but which 
have been successively 
        demolished by the power of reason and opinion, leaving the place 
they once took up 
        to be occupied by the wide principles the application of which 
they have vainly 
        sought to circumscribe.” (Times, 9 June 1864, p.10)
    But just as it took time to see the true merits of laws which enshrined the principles of 
political economy, so an economy could survive for a while with laws that transgressed 
them, as Lowe pointed out when, in the American Civil War, the Union made the dollar 
inconvertible and yet their financial system did not immediately collapse.
IV. MONEY AND METHOD
        Lowe’s first main engagement with monetary economics came in 
the series of leaders – thunderous even by his standards – that he 
wrote on the Northern side’s financing of the American Civil War. 
The fact that they were about to resort to paper to continue the war, 
Lowe wrote in 1862, would lead anyone “reasonable” to abandon the 
fight without delay.   Instead, the U.S. was about to “carry disorder, 
confusion and misery into the affairs of private life, to disorganise the 
relations between debtor and creditor, and to render general ruin as 
calamitous and disgraceful as possible.”  (Times, 5 February 1862, 
p.8)    And, four months later:  “… either the dismal science or the 
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present things in America must be overthrown. The world is not wide 
enough to hold them both.” (ibid., 24 June 1862, p.7) 
        This second front in the American civil war began with a quick 
victory for the dismal science, as paper depreciated 20% against gold, 
and the drain of gold out of the U.S. forced the government to prohibit 
further gold export.  “Nemesis” Lowe rejoiced “has come at last.” 
(Times, 31 July 1862, p.10 )     But a month later he conceded he had 
been premature.   As the gold premium stabilised, Lowe counselled 
“not to expect that simply because we see a thing clearly it must 
necessarily follow speedily.”  (ibid., 22 August 1862, p.6)    American 
tariffs had cut their import bill, smugglers were still organising 
themselves to beat the gold export embargo, and the California gold 
mines had gone into overtime.  But Lowe’s confidence was unshaken 
that the laws of political economy would defeat their violators in the 
end.  What followed is so good a summary of Lowe’s lifelong attitude 
to political economy that it is worth quoting at length.
        “It is easy for a person moderately versed in the laws of 
economical science to apply   
        abstract principles to undoubted facts, and to draw from them 
conclusions in which 
        he feels the most perfect confidence.   But the realisation of 
these conclusions as a 
        fact must depend on numberless circumstances of which general 
and abstract 
        speculation can take no account.   The laws of political economy 
are sure ultimately 
        to assert themselves, but the laws of political economy are, after 
all, only the laws of 
        the human mind, and the predictions of the future which the 
science enables us to 
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        make are founded on the supposition that those laws take their 
uniform and usual 
        course.   Political economy assumes that mankind, taken in the 
mass and in the long 
        run, will act according to that which they believe to be their true 
interest; but 
        political economy makes no allowance for all those things which 
blind men as to 
        what their true interest is – vanity, patriotism, loyalty, hope, 
ambition, imagination, 
        with all their exaggerating and distorting powers, are banished 
from the creed of the 
        dismal science.   These things tend to modify conclusions and to 
retard the action of 
        general principles, but how far they do this every speculator 
must investigate and 
        consider for himself.” (ibid., 22 August 1862, p.6)
            In this passage Lowe has distanced himself from Mill’s 
methodological position in three ways.    First, Mill holds that the 
principles of economics are subject to appropriate conditions of 
application, but holds out no certainty that these will eventually come 
about in any given context.   Lowe does possess such certainty: the 
action of general principles can at most be “retarded.”   Secondly, 
while Lowe’s political economy “makes no allowance” for non-
economic motives, Mill believed it must make such allowance if it 
were to influence the public and guide the legislator.   It might be 
argued that the difference is definitional: the responsibilities Mill lays 
on political economy are laid by Lowe on the individual “speculator”. 
The end-product is the same: what does it matter what is nominally 
placed within the definition of political economy and what the user is 
told he is required to add to it?   But the third and greatest difference 
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between Lowe and Mill cannot be dissolved into semantics.   The non-
economic motives which both believe to be so important are, 
nonetheless, to Lowe, illusions which “blind men as to what their true 
interest is.”   It is one thing to say that patriotism or loyalty induce 
altruistic actions which may disrupt economic theories.   It is quite 
another to take a lumpenmarxist line that these feelings are a form of 
“false consciousness”.  What Lowe probably meant was not that a 
patriot was a deluded fool – his own patriotic sentiments were often 
on display -- but that patriotic sentiments, like everything else, do not 
endure in the same way as do the imperatives of economic interest.
V. PRINCIPLES OR CATCH-WORDS?
        Lowe’s definition of political economy was sure and simple.   It 
was the science that traced the consequences of the desire for gain. 
Its strength lay in the soundness of its basic postulate, and was 
revealed by the success of laws passed in accordance with the 
deductions made from that postulate.   Particularly impressive was the 
way that those unable to grasp political economy nonetheless came to 
believe in it through the results of such laws – though the results 
might take a while and their clear perception still longer.   And, 
because political economy deduced exact conclusions from first 
principles, it not only knew when an exception was an exception, but 
was well placed to find out why.   When the world in general, and the 
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results of legislation in particular, diverged from the deductions of 
political economy, economists sought and invariably found 
explanations of why ceteris  had failed to be paribus. 
Falsificationists’ problems begin at this point but Lowe, like Mill, was 
no falsificationist. 
        Political economy, furthermore, had its own, rather booming, 
voice  -- in fact it sounded startlingly like the voice of Robert Lowe.   It 
“prescribed” freedom of contract, “forbade” negotiating over tariffs, 
and “ruled that” tariffs were only justified in order to collect revenue. 
Education was “no exception to the general rules of political 
economy”.  Gladstone’s budget of 1860 had “contaminated the truths 
of financial science” and the commercial treaty it encompassed had 
dragged free trade down “from the dignity of a science to the foggy 
regions of diplomacy.”   Despite such mistakes, most of the laws of the 
pre-1867 parliament were framed “in accordance with the principles 
of political economy”, notably the cuts in indirect taxes between 1846 
and 1860, and the retention of Irish landlords’ freedom to do what 
they liked with their land. 6
        Some of these statements sound stronger than others.  “In 
accordance with the laws of political economy” suggests more room 
for manoeuvre than “prescribed” or “ruled” by political economy.  But 
perhaps not too much weight should be placed on this.   Lowe was 
writing leaders in The Times,  not scholarly articles on the philosophy 
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of science.   Probably his exact choice of words was not as exact as all 
that.   What he meant on each occasion was that the principles of 
political economy could be used to identify what would increase the 
wealth of the nation, or at least some part of it.  (He would have 
clasped the idea of Pareto-efficiency with enthusiasm had it been 
around in his time.)
        Lowe’s conception of political economy came under fiercest 
attack when he applied it to Ireland.      In fact, however, his 
differences with Mill (his chief critic) owed little to their different 
versions of economics  -- a fact that Lowe realised more clearly than 
Mill did.   Certainly it was far from a simple clash between an 
absolutist and a relativist.   When in 1866 Lord John Russell’s 
administration introduced a bill compensating evicted Irish tenants 
for improvements they had made, Lowe invited its supporters to put 
up a relativist case for the proposal.   If, he said, it was being 
advanced in grounds peculiar to Ireland, “I can understand it.   But if 
the ground is that of natural justice and right, it is not peculiar to one 
side of the Channel or the other.” 7  
       Lowe’s position was grounded in his belief that a modern system 
of capitalist agriculture (vainly recommended by Nassau Senior) was 
at last emerging.   This was the real basis of his conflict with Mill, who 
never altered his view, stated at the height of the potato famine in 
1847, that  capitalist farming was “wholly impracticable … the people 
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are there, and the problem is not to improve the country but to see 
how it can be improved by and for its present inhabitants.”  (Black 
1960, p.31). Mill wanted to keep the peasants on the land, while 
pointing out that land laws the same as England’s had very different 
results in Ireland.   The tenantry’s demand for land was so strong that 
the landlord could do what he pleased.   Lowe concurred in the 
diagnosis but not the remedy.  If the tenant’s plight were caused by 
his insatiable demand for land, the only remedy was to reduce it.  This 
could only be done by finding some would-be tenants alternative 
employment.   If Ireland could not attract investment in 
manufacturing, the only solution left was mass emigration. 
Compensation for improvements would “put into action a set of causes 
which must infallibly drag Ireland down to the fearful position she 
held before 1846.   You will give her back her lost millions, to be 
swept away by another famine.” (Lowe 1868, pp.274-5) 8
       Lowe wrote this in 1868. By the end of the year he was 
Chancellor in a government whose mission was “to pacify Ireland.” 
After much hard work in 1869, Lowe’s Cabinet colleagues finally 
persuaded him to support a Bill compensating Irish tenants for 
improvements made to their land.   The price of Lowe’s support was a 
compromise Bill which specifically denied compensation to tenants 
evicted for non-payment of rent, and allowed the landlord to extend 
any tenant’s lease to 31 years in order to escape claims for 
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compensation.    Outside Cabinet, with no negotiations to conduct or 
compromises to steer, Lowe remained closer to his underlying 
instincts.   On the same day as he proposed the Compensation Courts 
he told Lady Salisbury that he had never been able to understand “the 
grievance of holding people to their contracts, nor able to find a 
better plan than leaving every man to do as he likes with his own time 
and labour.”  (Burghclere 1933, p.232)    The charge against Lowe, 
stretching from Mill in 1868, through Leslie (1879) to Moore (1996) 
was that he had shut himself off from such understanding by his 
conception of political economy.   In a passage well known to 
historians of economic thought, Mill, speaking in parliament on 12 
March 1868, declared that “political economy has many enemies, but 
its worst enemies are some of its friends, and I do not know that it has 
a more dangerous enemy than my hon. Friend.” 9   Lowe, said Mill, 
had spoken “as if science was a thing not to guide our judgement, but 
to stand in its place”. 10    But:
        “so far from being a set of maxims and rules to be applied 
without regard to times, 
        places and circumstances, the function of political economy is to 
enable us to find   
        the rules to govern any state of circumstances with which we 
have to deal … it does 
        not supply us with a ready-made judgement upon any case, and 
there cannot be a 
        greater enemy to political economy than he who represents it in 
that light.” 11
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     Mill may or may not have felt these strictures described Lowe’s 
economics in general: he was specifically criticising the speech Lowe 
had made immediately before his own.   In this speech Lowe had 
pressed the laws of economics into the service of one thing only – 
freedom to dispose of your property as you wish.
        “… there is an oasis in the desert of politics upon which we may 
safely rest, and  
        that is afforded by the principles of political economy.   In 
accordance with the best 
        ascertained principles of political economy, as well as of law, 
every man who has  
        made money is entitled to invest it in land; and if you introduce 
arbitrary 
        restrictions with respect to land, you artificially depreciate that 
description of 
        property compared with other property.   Freedom of disposition 
of land is a strong 
        stimulus to that desire of accumulation on which the wealth of 
nations depend.   I 
        entertain a prejudice derived from Scotland and adopted by 
Adam Smith, that a man 
        is at liberty to do what he likes with his own, and that having 
land, it is not 
        unreasonable that he should be free to let his land to a person of 
full age upon the 
        terms upon which they shall mutually agree.   That I believe to be 
reason and good 
        political economy.” 12
One reason why political economy could bring to Ireland this sole – if 
supremely important – lesson was that Lowe excluded so much from 
the subject’s scope.
        “The questions so much agitated by Mr Mill, as to whether small 
cultivation is     
        better than large, are not political; no, nor, with all deference to 
him be it said, are 
        they politico-economical: they belong to the science of practical 
agriculture, and to 
24
        the practical agriculturist we should leave them to work out for 
himself.” (Lowe 
       1868, pp.272-3) 
   Even Lowe could hardly have expected Mill to be warned off the 
question on the strength of this, and in 1870 Mill returned to the 
attack on economists who
    “believe themselves to be provided with a set of catch-words, which 
they mistake for    
    principles – free trade, freedom of contract, competition, demand 
and supply, the 
    wages fund, individual interest, desire of wealth, &c. – which 
supersede analysis, and 
    are applicable to every variety of cases without the trouble of 
thought.” (Mill 1870,  
    p.671).
        Perhaps this is aimed specifically at Lowe – Mill does not say. 
But does Lowe deserve it?   We have seen little evidence of his using 
free trade or any other of the phrases on Mill’s list as a substitute for 
analysis.   The one “catchword” he did use to try and close arguments 
down was not the name of some topic in political economy but the 
name of political economy itself.   And even here it is sparingly 
invoked.   Precisely because Lowe does use it as a slogan, it in the end 
adds nothing essential to the edifice of his arguments over Ireland – 
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an edifice which would look very little different had Lowe never 
referred to the scope, nature or methodology of economics in his life. 
VI. LOWE AND ADAM SMITH
        And until 1878 Lowe showed little interest in the methodology of 
economics as such.   Like anyone else, he had an implicit methodology 
of his own.  This was determined negatively, by his very limited 
statement of conditions of application for his economic doctrines.  To 
say that disturbing forces existed but, once identified, they merely 
reflected back the searchlight of economic analysis in increased 
splendour, was at once far less sophisticated than Mill’s treatment and 
a superb provocation to the likes of Cliffe Leslie.  If Lowe was not 
especially interested in methodology, the English historical school 
were not especially interested in anything else.  And, central to their 
dispute with Lowe were the roles the two sides has assigned to Adam 
Smith.
       On 31 May 1876 the Political Economy Club met to celebrate the 
centenary of The Wealth of Nations.  Gladstone was in the chair. 
Lowe’s speech was most remarkable for his characterisation of 
political economy as a finished subject.  “The great work has been 
done.”  (Political Economy Club, 1876, p.21)  This belief, in sharp 
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contrast to Mill or Cairnes (not to mention Leslie, who wanted the 
great work to start all over again) informed Lowe’s attitude to policy 
questions.   The fact that he was often less narrow and dogmatic than 
his opponents claimed does not abolish the rift between his view that 
the precepts of political economy could be pulled off the shelf to guide 
the policies of the day, and the more cautious view of Mill (and later 
Marshall) that the issue in hand should force some hard thought over 
the scope and possible future direction of political economy.   It is 
much easier to downgrade particular historical and geographical 
circumstances into “friction” if one has a finalised view of what the 
friction is rubbing up against.
         But it was Lowe’s characterisation of Smith himself which 
aroused the most ire at and after the centenary dinner.   Smith, Lowe 
told the Political Economy Club, was the first and only man to discover 
a real science of mankind. To discover universal truths about 
humanity, to weld them into a system of analysis, and then to 
promulgate that system so that it caught legislators’ minds demanded 
such rare gifts, in such unusual combination, that only one man in 
history had ever succeeded. In thus placing Ricardo and Mill so firmly 
in Smith’s rearguard, Lowe was also reinforcing what he saw as the 
methodological unity of the classical school. 13  In his address to 
Section F of the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 
1878, J.K.Ingram followed Cliffe Leslie in driving the stoutest possible 
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wedge between Smith, a historically-minded empiricist, and Ricardo, 
who instead built a mountain of deductions on the unreal stereotype 
of “economic man.”   In “Recent Attacks on Political Economy (1878), 
Lowe challenged Ingram “to produce a single instance from The 
Wealth of Nations where Smith has had recourse to the method of 
induction.” (Lowe 1878, p.865)   Induction meant inference: Smith 
observed, compared, explained and illustrated.   The one thing he did 
not do was infer.   Division of labour was a good example.   First Smith 
asserted the principle, then he illustrated it.  “Had he proceeded by 
the inductive method, he would have cited a number of trades in 
which the division of labour has been found of great advantage and 
from these instances would have deduced his principle.” (ibid., p.866) 
        This is not much of a response.   Whether actual instances of the 
division of labour come at the beginning or the end of chapter 1 of 
The Wealth of Nations  tells us nothing as to how Smith arrived  at the 
principle in his mind – as indeed Lowe proceeds to 
admit: “Adam Smith … professorlike, was more solicitous to teach 
what he believed to be true than to impart the exact sources from 
which he derived his information.”  (ibid., p.866) 14  
        Lowe then compares The Theory  of Moral Sentiments and The 
Wealth of Nations.    Why, asks Lowe, does the former work fail in its 
leading doctrine that sympathy forms the foundation of morals? 
(Smith’s admirers might well interject at this point that they didn’t 
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know it had.)   Because Moral Sentiments  had “admitted of all 
motives except the single one of pecuniary interest”, with the result 
that the deductive method “was not refined enough” for it. (ibid., 
p.867)   In The Wealth of Nations,  by contrast, Smith isolated the 
desire for gain, deduced its consequences, compared its predictions 
with the evidence, and in doing so was entitled to “the merit, and the 
unique merit of all men who ever lived in this world, of having 
founded a deductive and demonstrative science of human conduct”; 
the  “noble attempt by Bentham and Mill to raise politics to a like 
eminence” having failed.  (Political Economy Club 1876, pp.7-8)
        With Smith boxed up in this fashion, it was an easy step to 
dismiss historical relativism – though Lowe denied he was doing this. 
On the contrary, he said, classical economics was itself relativist, 
insofar as its premises could only be “brought into existence” by the 
subject-matter they analysed:
        “To suppose that political economists think otherwise is to 
impute to them a most   
        melancholy economy of brains.  All that political economy 
pretends to is that, when 
        and in proportion as these things come into existence, the 
principles which apply to 
        them come into existence with them.” (Lowe, 1878, p.868) 
“I contend”, says Moore (1996, p.87) “that these admissions were no 
more than cosmetic qualifications designed to meet the numerous 
criticisms of his approach.”  Taken purely in the context of “Recent 
Attacks on Political Economy” this is an arguable position (though 
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even here one might comment that falsifying his beliefs was not 
exactly a leitmtoif  of Lowe’s, and, if he is not being accused of this, 
what exactly is “cosmetic” about his remarks?)   But the testimony of 
Lowe’s earlier writings in The Times  shows his lifelong awareness 
that the conditions of application had to be right for political economy 
to make headway. 
         This, however, was not relativism as Ingram or Leslie would 
have understood it.  Their relativism was the assertion that you 
needed different principles to analyse different times and places, each 
set of principles equally valid in its own context.   Lowe in contrast 
was saying there was a single set of principles which could be applied 
once the world had constituted itself into something to apply them to. 
Until then, there were not alternative varieties of economics : there 
was no economics. 15  
VII. VULGAR ECONOMICS?
        So the birth of economic science had to wait for a tractable 
world, and for a genius to perceive that tractable world around him. 
But, once on its feet, the science had enjoyed huge success, colonising 
diverse areas of activity in a way which might have surprised its 
founder.  At the Wealth of Nations  centenary Lowe repeated his 1864 
criticism that Smith had not been Smithian enough – though giving 
him credit for William Pitt’s French treaty, abolition of monopolies in 
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the colonies and indeed, once the germ of Smith’s ideas had been fully 
worked out by others, the repeal of the corn laws and the 
establishment of limited liability.   He also proclaimed himself 
optimistic that a better educated working class would learn from 
Smith the “errors and follies” of trade union behaviour. (Political 
Economy Club 1876, pp.14-19)
        The most authentic Lowe thumbprint, however, had been in his 
1864 piece—his remark that in other spheres investigation blew up 
exceptions into alternative rules but in political economy it closed 
them down.   That this, more than anything else, proved the strength 
and soundness of the subject and its worthiness to be called a science, 
was a constant refrain of Lowe’s.  Above all political economy was, 
and would remain, a vastly more successful way of understanding the 
world than the sociology into which Ingram wanted to subsume it. 
Back in 1865 Lowe had ridiculed the Social Science Congress for 
“professing the cultivation of a branch of human knowledge which as 
yet has little existence except in its pretentious name.” (Times, 2 
October 1865, p.9)  Now he suggested that Ingram might have 
accompanied his eulogium of sociology with some evidence that it 
existed.   “It is a gross abuse of language … to degrade the name of 
science by confounding it with crude and tentative attempts to create 
science.”   Sociology would have been created when it started making 
verifiable predictions, and when “the economical phenomena which 
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are treated of in political economy  are really dominated by some 
higher and more comprehensive generalisation.” (Lowe 1878, p.860) 
Expect a long wait, Lowe warned, as long as sociology tried to apply 
to mankind the inductive method which could only work in the natural 
scientist’s laboratory.  Political economy had succeeded precisely 
because it recognised that human behaviour was so complex as to 
make a deductive approach not infeasible but unavoidable.
        “…the facts are often intensely complicated … separated from us 
often by vast 
        intervals of space and time [and] subject to the distortion, 
falsification and 
        exaggeration which interest, bigotry, love, hatred, ignorance and 
party spirit can 
        introduce.   We are expected, out of the shreds and fragments of 
ancient science, life  
        and history which have come down to us mutilated, unvouched 
and unauthenticated,   
        utterly hidden from the actors in those remote sciences 
themselves.” 
       (ibid., pp.861-2 )
And the measure of its success was what we now owed it:
        “among other things, the repeal of hundreds of galling taxes on 
almost all the  
        comforts of life and on the food of the people, the repeal of the 
corn and navigation 
         laws, the cessation of smuggling, the placing of the currency on 
a thoroughly sound 
        and satisfactory basis, the establishment of limited liability in 
joint-stock companies, 
        the principle of payment by results, open competition for public 
appointments, and 
        the abolition of the absurd system of bounties and drawbacks. 
These are some of 
        the achievements of the past.   I may be excused if I prefer them 
to the shadowy and   
        unrealised anticipations of the future.” (ibid., p.868)
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     Lowe’s article drew a swift response form Cliffe Leslie.   Its theme 
was that orthodox economists who looked at Lowe would see only a 
mildly distorted version of their own basic principles – distorted, 
indeed, by an honesty which they themselves lacked.   Certainly Lowe 
had exposed the absurdity of his own views, said Leslie, offering up 
targets like the remark that “if you place a man’s ear within the ring 
of pounds, shillings and pence, his conduct can be counted on to the 
greatest nicety.”  (Leslie 1879, p.203) But there was no great 
distinction between Lowe’s omission of all human motives except the 
desire for wealth, and the fate of these motives in the work of Mill and 
J. E. Cairnes, where they were “admitted at the outset for form’s sake, 
to be afterwards set aside as ‘disturbing causes’ in a manner without 
precedent or analogy in physical science.” (ibid., p.198)
        However, in the matter of prediction in economics, Leslie did 
drive a qualitative wedge between Lowe and Mill or Cairnes.    Lowe 
failed to realise, Leslie said, that his simplistic assumptions and his 
goal of prediction were incompatible: by throwing out so many 
motives he had no hope of success in the prediction he valued so 
highly.   At least Mill had realised that conclusions derived from the a 
priori  method were “true only in the abstract” and would be “true 
without qualification only in purely imaginary cases.” (ibid., p.198)
        This limitation came about precisely because Mill had effectively 
removed so many human motives from the cognisance of political 
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economy.  And this situation would continue as long as economists 
clung to Cairnes’ doctrine that “the economist starts with a 
knowledge of ultimate causes [and] is already at the outset of his 
enterprise, in the position which the physicist only attains after ages 
of laborious research.” (ibid., p.202)   On that basis, the foundation of 
all economics must be introspection and so -- unless deductivists 
imagined that they could also intuit all moral, religious, political and 
other motives influencing human conduct – they were stuck with a 
“science” effectively just as narrow as Lowe’s version. 
        Leslie saw nothing wrong with prediction as one of the goals of 
economics, and indeed went out of his way to stress the power of 
prediction if the agenda were only widened.   It was because 
marriages and births were the result of “love, chivalrous sentiment, 
morals and religion” that their incidence could be foretold. (ibid., 
p.211)   But on the whole it was failure to understand, not failure to 
predict, which he condemned as the inevitable result of the method 
recommended by Lowe.   Look at the German economy, so geared 
towards war.  What would be the worth of a treatise deducing its 
characteristics “from the assumption that every man is occupied 
solely in the acquisition of wealth”? (ibid., p.210)   Lowe (and by 
implication Mill and Cairnes) had ruled himself out from explaining 
why economies differed in their basic structure, occupational patterns 
and consumers’ wants. (ibid., p.212) 
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     Lowe no doubt took the final charge with equanimity.   He had 
already invited economists to share his indifference as to whether 
people preferred to grow pigs or tulips. (Lowe 1879, p.995).   But 
Leslie also charged that  Lowe’s methodology stopped him having 
anything to say about why some economies grew while others 
stagnated.   Enough has been said for the reader to imagine the depth 
of Lowe’s indignation on this score.   His entire defence of classical 
political economy rested on the idea that without its doctrines there 
would have been no liberal legislation and without liberal legislation 
Britain would be much less prosperous.   Nor does Leslie disagree 
with this: his accusation is rather that Lowe has misunderstood the 
character of classical (or at any rate Smithian) economics.   “Mr Lowe 
arrogates ‘triumphs’ for his own economic method: those he refers to 
were achieved by the opposite method of reasoning from observation 
and experience.” (Leslie 1879, p.219)
        Leslie could hardly have made himself clearer.   Political 
economy could indeed claim legislative triumphs which had fostered 
the general good, and he and Lowe could agree what those triumphs 
were, whatever their differences about the underlying nature of the 
political economy which had produced them.   It was left for Moore 
(1996) to adjudicate that Lowe had made mercantile success the only 
criterion of the success of political economy and thus justified 
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Carlyle’s jibe about “pig philosophy.”  On the basis of the remark 
quoted above, Leslie ought to join Lowe in the trough.
        But Lowe was not a pig philosopher. He was an idiosyncratic, but 
not profoundly original, classical survivor who, like most of his 
contemporaries, saw nothing wrong with evaluating economics by the 
results of legislation passed in consonance with its principles.  He 
would not go down well at a modern conference on the methodology 
of economics, but neither would a great many other people whose 
porcine qualities are not obviously to the fore.
        As for Lowe’s scorn for sociology, the present writer is going to 
infuriate his shade by suggesting that his own deepest convictions  -- 
taking precedence over even his economic liberalism – may properly 
be called sociological.    There are two ways to get an economic liberal 
to talk about class.  One is to put him in a society full of legal 
privileges for sectional interests.   The other is to confront him with 
collectivist views themselves dominated by class.   The second method 
barely worked on Lowe.  He was enthusiastic enough in his search for 
intellectual positions to attack.   They did not include socialism or 
communism, which he did  use simply as catchwords (again wrong-
footing Mill and his list).   It was John Morley, not Lowe, who apprised 
Gladstone of the very interesting ideas of Dr Marx of Highgate.  
        But class privilege was a lifelong target. Hence his revealing 
statement  that the doctrine that no one class in the country should be 
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made tributary to another class was not only the grand principle of 
free trade, but far more valuable than free trade itself.   Hence his 
anger when Lord Overstone tried to exclude the poor from 
shareholding and his insistence – more intense and protracted than 
any of his contemporaries – that the tax system be fair to all classes. 
There will always be those who say that the removal of sectional 
privileges itself privileges the class that alone does not have to rely on 
such assistance to begin with  -- the ruling class, or the owners of the 
means of production, if one wants to put it in Marxist language. 
There is much to be said for this view but Lowe would not have said it. 
“The ideal of the Liberal Party” he said in 1877:
        “… consists in a view of things undisturbed and undistorted by 
the promptings of 
        interest and prejudice, in a complete independence of all class 
interests, and in 
        relying for its success on the better feelings of mankind.” 16
“Happier words” commented Matthew Arnold (not always a Lowe 
enthusiast) “could not well be found : such is, indeed, the ideal of the 
Liberal Party”   17 
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FOOTNOTES
1 History of the Times,  London 1936-9, vol. 2,  pp.131 ff.  There is 
only one instance in  
    the letters of Delane telling Lowe what to write: Delane wanted an 
editorial on some 
    negotiations taking place with Canada, and urged Lowe not to 
“throw too much cold 
    water upon it.”   Lowe complied with the first part of the request, 
but refused the 
    second.   Where Lowe’s own feelings were not engaged he was 
willing to be a  
    “passive instrument” ; and on another occasion he checked that 
Delane’s view 
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    concurred with his own before writing anything.   As for editorial 
alteration of 
    Lowe’s leaders after he sent them in, there is one instance of Lowe 
approving a piece 
    of editing as actually amplifying his own view, and one of Lowe 
regretfully informing 
    Delane that no change could be made as the leader was already in 
the press.   On the 
    other side of the coin, Lowe was more than willing to tell Delane 
what to write, 
    notably in 1863 when Delane had got drawn into a long-running 
row between Cobden 
    and Lowe.  Later Delane received a severe rebuke for being 
insufficiently hostile to the 
    Second Reform Bill.   The friendship between the two men was 
close (it was in Delane 
    that Lowe chose to confide the details of his deteriorating 
marriage) but the 
    correspondence reads as if neither forgot that Delane had once 
been Lowe’s pupil at 
    Oxford .Delane Papers, News International Archives,  JTD 12/136 
(21 & 23      
    December 1863), 14/16 (12 & 13 June 1865), 14/109 (15 December 
1865), 15/6 (10 
    January 1866), 15/41 (28 March 1866), 15/62 (28 June 1866), 16/12 
(22 January  
   1867).
 
2 Hansard,  3rd series, 126, 935, 2 May 1853
3  For more on the political background to the treaty, see Morley 
(1910), Iliasu (1965) 
    and Howe (1997).
4 “Commercial Diplomacy, 1860-1902”, printed for private circulation 
by the Foreign 
   Office, 1902.  Public Record Office, Treasury Papers 172/945, p.5
5 In his Parliamentary  speeches of 1865-7, opposing the extension of 
the franchise, 
  Lowe made much more of the link between democracy and 
protectionism than he ever 
  did in The Times. “Protection … is the political economy of the poor, 
simply 
   because they are not able to follow the chain of reasoning which 
demonstrates that they 
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   themselves are sure to be the victims of the waste of capital which 
protection implies.”   
   (Lowe, 1867, p.10)   And anyone who wanted to see how democracy 
extinguished free 
   trade need only look at Canada, New South Wales, Victoria and 
above all the U.S.A. 
   (ibid.,  p.149) 
6 Times, 11 June 1866, p.8, 1 August 1860, p.8, 23 January 1860, p.6; 
Lowe to Sir  
   John Simon, 31 October 1868, quoted in Sylvester (1974) p.23 ; 
Times,  27 February   
   1860, p.6, 11 August 1865, p.6, 8 December 1859 p.6; Hansard, 
190, 1493, 12 March 
   1868. 
7 Hansard., 3rd series, 183, 1078 (17 May 1866)
8 Mill, too, saw emigration as at any rate part of the solution to 
Ireland’s problems.  The 
   main  opponent among economists was Cliffe Leslie, who rejected 
emigration as a  
   misconceived inference from a misconceived doctrine (the wage 
fund) and a “waste of 
   industrial power and national strength”  (Black,  2002 p.30)
9 Hansard, 3rd series, 190, 1525, 12 March 1868
10 ibid., 1526
11 ibid., 1525-6
12 ibid., 1493
13 Lowe’s interpretation of Smith particularly incensed Frederic 
Harrison, who had not 
   been present at the centenary dinner but who wrote of the 
published proceedings that 
   “Lowe’s sordid cunning came out in all its nakedness” (1/82/16, 
Harrison to Morley, 
   June 1876, LSE archives).
14 Cliffe Leslie rightly found this concession of Lowe’s inadequate, 
pointing 
    out that chapter 1 of The Wealth of Nations  “bears all the marks of 
wide research and   
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    induction.” Of course Smith did not set before the reader every 
historical and statistical 
    fact he had discovered. “A discoverer would be avoided like the 
pestilence if he did 
    this” and no doubt this kind of thing was in the papers Smith had 
burnt shortly before 
    he died (Leslie 1879, pp.206-7)
 15 This, as Cliffe Leslie was to point out, was essentially the same as 
Bagehot’s  
      position, though Bagehot went further than Lowe and limited 
political economy to   
     “England at its present state of commercial development and to 
the male sex in 
     England.” (Leslie1879 p.207).   Leslie said that this, if accepted, 
proved on its own   
     that political economy began with induction  -- the induction 
needed to decide which  
     societies were ripe for the political economy treatment.   Bagehot 
agreed with this last 
     point, and  there is no reason to think Lowe would have objected 
either.   It was, in  
     fact, a common position in late nineteenth-century political 
economy, and Sir Henry 
     Maine, whose study of comparative law did so much to advance 
this attitude in the 
     work of others, held it strongly himself  (see, e.g.,  “The Effects of 
Observation of    
     India on Modern European Thought”, his Rede Lecture at 
Cambridge University,   
     1875, reprinted in  Maine, 1876).
16  Lowe (1877) quoted in Martin (1893), vol. 2, p.445. 
17  ibid.,  p.445
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